Economic Integration and Labor Market Institutions:
Worker Mobility, Earnings Risk, and Contract Structure
by
Ronnie Schoeb Center for Economic Studies Schackstrasse 4 D-80539 Munich GERMANY
and
David E. Wildasin Martin School of Public Policy and Department of Economics University of Kentucky Lexington, KY 40506-0027 USA
Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of labor
market integration, in the form of worker mobility, in a model with
long-term labor contracts that lead to wage rigidities and unemployment. Reflecting the interdependence of regional labor markets, we
develop a framework where the contract structure is simultaneously
determined in all regions. It is shown that increased mobility leads
to more flexible labor market institutions in which firms can more
easily vary the level of employment in response to fluctuations in
demand. Economic integration is potentially Pareto-improving but, in
the absence of a system of compensation, workers are harmed by greater
labor mobility while the owners of firms benefit from higher profits.
David Wildasin / dew@davidwildasin.us