Tax-Transfer Policies and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
by
Robin Boadway
Queens University
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6
Canada
and
Pierre Pestieau
University of Liege
Liege, Belgium
and
Universite Catholique de Louvaine
Louvaine-la-Neuve, Belgium
and
David E. Wildasin
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47045
USA
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it extends previous models of non-cooperative private funding of pure public goods by allowing both for distortionary taxation of private goods and for subsidies based on contributions to the public goods. Second, it clarifies the type of behavioral and informational assumptions which are needed to insure neutrality of both lump-sum and distortionary policies. The analysis is developed in the context of fiscal federalism.
David E. Wildasin / dew@davidwildasin.us
